Archive for the ‘governance’ Category
Reverse Discrimination in High-Profile Hiring
Filed under: activism, decision-making, discrimination, governance, leadership, stakeholders, values |
Comments (5) Discrimination has a bad name, in part because what we typically mean by the word “discrimination” is more like “unjustified discrimination” or “discrimination on morally-irrelevant grounds.” But discrimination per se — even discrimination based on normally-irrelevant characteristics like race or disability — is not always bad. In a very few cases, discrimination is rooted in bona fide job requirements. The classic example is that it’s OK to discriminate against the visually impaired if you’re hiring pilots; having good eye-sight is a bona fide requirement for being a pilot. Being white, on the other hand, is not.
For a recent controversy over reverse discrimination (or rather over a failure to engage in such discrimination) see this recent case from Halifax, Nova Scotia. By Clare Mellor, for the Chronicle Herald: Africville trust hiring prompts some anger: Choosing white minister ‘insulting’
Some members of Nova Scotia’s black community say they are outraged that a white person has been hired as executive director of the Africville Heritage Trust and are calling for her resignation.
“I find it insulting to all black people,” said Burnley (Rocky) Jones, a local lawyer and well-known human rights activist.
“Surely we, within our community, have many people fully qualified to do such a job.”
The trust was set up to establish a memorial to Africville, a major African-Nova Scotian community destroyed on the orders of Halifax officials in the 1960s.
The trust’s board of directors, which includes six representatives of the Africville community, recently hired Carole Nixon, a white Anglican minister, for the position….
So-called “reverse discrimination” is challenging, ethically. Preferential hiring of individuals from historically-disadvantaged groups can be a ham-fisted way to right past wrongs. But in at least some cases — particularly cases involving high-profile positions — the symbolic significance of the job in question has to at least be considered. (A very similar controversy arose a couple of years ago, when the Canadian National Institute for the Blind hired its first non-blind CEO.)
The first thing to note about the Halifax / Africville case is that it’s not primarily a black-vs-white dispute. It’s clear that those who oppose the hire don’t speak for Halifax’s entire black community. The Board of Directors of the Africville Trust is the body that did the hiring, and although detailed information about the composition of the Board is hard to find, the article cited above does say that the Board “includes six representatives of the Africville [i.e., black] community.” That doesn’t change the fundamental ethical questions at stake, but it does sweep away any thought that this is just an us-vs-them debate.
It’s also worth pointing out a legal worry, here. Hiring based on race is generally wrong, and typically illegal. It’s not clear to me (a non-lawyer) that excluding non-blacks from consideration for a job like this would even be legal. Do the critics of this hire simply think that the job posting should have said “Whites Need Not Apply?” Likely not. But a subtler position is logically open to them, anyway, namely a position that says something like “if in doubt, give the job to the black candidate” (based perhaps on a presumption of greater personal understanding of the issues at stake). But again, I don’t know whether that would be legal. (Does anyone reading this know?) And surely no on really wants to settle, as one activist quoted in the story suggests, for a candidate who is merely “fully qualified”. After all, there might well be a number of “fully qualified” candidates, and so you’re still going to need to make a decision. And if the job is important, then we likely want it filled not just by someone qualified, but by the most qualified person.
But on the other hand, critics of this decision do have a point, and that has to do with the symbolic value that would attach to putting a black person in charge of the Africville Trust. It’s not hard to see that selecting a black man or woman for this kind of leadership role would send a certain kind of message, and maybe give black kids in Halifax another positive role-model, one more non-white individual occupying a position of prestige and influence.
All in all, I’m not sure what to think about this one. But one thing I’m pretty sure of is this: if you think a case like this has a clear and simple answer, you’re probably not thinking about it hard enough.
Academic Business Ethics and the Corporation as Political Actor
Filed under: corporate citizenship, corporations, CSR, ethics, governance, government, law, personhood, politics, regulations, rights |
Leave a Comment I’m returning home today after spending the weekend at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Business Ethics, the world’s foremost association for academics engaged in the study and teaching of issues related to business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and so on. (It was a fantastic meeting and anyone with a professional interest in these issues should consider joining SBE.)
One of the dominant themes of this year’s meeting was the role of the corporation in the political realm. It’s an old topic, one revitalized by the US Supreme Court’s decision last year in the Citizens United case. Corporate involvement in the political sphere takes many forms (from lobbying to campaign donations to participation in collaborative approaches to regulation). Such involvement is probably inevitable, but definitely controversial, and so there’s lots to sort out regarding how we should understand corporations in the political realm, and what rights and responsibilities they should have in that world. Among several dozen scholars presenting their research at the SBE meeting, a striking proportion of them presented work related to this set of topics.
David Ronnegard and Craig Smith, for example, presented work that elucidated the connection between competing theories of business ethics, on one hand, and competing theories from political philosophy, on the other.
Anselm Schneider and Andreas Scherer presented their work on the changes in corporate governance necessitated by (what I would call) the quasi-governmental responsibilities that corporations sometimes take on in the international sphere.
Pierre-Yves Néron presented work arguing that the way we think of corporations in the public sphere ought to be strongly influenced by thinking about the kinds of corporate behaviours (including regulatory lobbying, for example) that can either improve or frustrate market efficiency.
Waheed Hussain presented his work on what it might look like to “civilize” the corporation to make its participation in the political realm less worrisome — essentially, by fostering among corporations a “public interest” ethos, and insisting that lobbying etc be framed in terms of the public good.
Wayne Norman encouraged his fellow business ethicists to pay more attention to regulation, rather than focusing (as the typically do) on the corporate ethical obligations that go “beyond mere compliance”.
I myself presented some of my current thinking on the various ways we might think of corporations in their interactions with government. In particular, I argued that while, in some cases, it makes sense to conceptualize the corporation as an agent in its own right, there are other cases (perhaps many more cases) in which it makes sense to think of the corporation as a tool or technology used by citizens to advance their goals. (This is something I’ve touched on before, informally, in a blog entry.)
Although I don’t want to speak for my colleagues, it seems safe to say that the scholars whose work is noted above share an interest in better understanding what it means, and what it should mean, for corporations to be political agents. They are part of a trend — I don’t yet want to say movement — that sees scholars attempting to take seriously the complexity of the practical and philosophical problems raised by having limited-liability, joint-stock corporations participate in a realm that is generally thought of as being rightfully the place of flesh-and-blood citizens.
Rupert Murdoch and Corporate Governance
Filed under: accountability, boards, CEOs, governance, leadership |
Comments (1) Given a scandal of the size of that unfolding at News of the World, it’s not surprising that people are beginning to look at root causes. One important causal factor is the way in which News of the World‘s parent company, News Corporation, is governed.
I wanted to hear from someone who really knows about this stuff, not just from an academic point of view but from the point of view of someone who has seen up-close just how corporate boards function, and how they malfunction. So I decided to fire a few questions at Prof. Richard Leblanc, an expert on governance and someone who has been engaged by corporations to perform board evaluations.
Here are my questions, and Richard’s answers:
CM: Rupert Murdoch is both CEO and Chairman of the Board at News Corp. From a practical point of view, why does that create problems in how a board operates?
RL: From a practical point of view, he’s running the meetings and controlling the agenda and the information flow. And as an independent director, you’re sitting there and you owe your position to him because he’s the significant shareholder. So you really aren’t independent, in the sense of making the final calls. You’re more of an advisor, or a friend, is what directors tell me who sit on control block boards.
CM: The Board at News Corp doesn’t seem to have a lot of independence. You’ve interviewed dozens of directors about what makes a board work well. How does lack of independence play out in terms of actual board dynamics? Does it really mean everyone just saying “yes sir” to the CEO?
RL: Independence is a state of mind. There are formal rules but that doesn’t capture the co-optation by the CEO, and personal and social ties. Second, independence should reflect reasonable perception standards, and in this case, independence from the significant shareholder. So when you have a non-independent board, or several directors who are beholden, things don’t get discussed, information doesn’t reach you, you don’t have executive sessions as you need to, and there’s less tone-checking.
CM: Without reference to News Corp in particular, what connection do you see between a well-functioning board and the likelihood of wrongdoing at a firm?
RL: I’ve assessed some of the best run corporate boards in the world. I’ve also assessed boards that have had massive failures, including death, property destruction and monetary loss. The best boards are independent, competent, transparent, constructively challenge management, and set the ethical tone and culture for the entire organization. Usually where there is some ethical failure, or corporate wrongdoing, there is some defect at the board level I find. Undue influence, bullying, poor design, lack of industry knowledge, and directors who are not engaged, or don’t have the power or incentives to be engaged, are some of the red flags.
The Complexity of Executive Compensation
Filed under: accountability, boards, CEOs, compensation, consultants, governance, pay, regulations |
Comments (2) Many jurisdictions have moved recently to give shareholders a “say on pay,” which typically means that companies are required to hold advisory (i.e., non-binding) shareholder votes on compensation. In other words, establishing executive pay remains the responsibility of the Board of Directors, but shareholders are given an opportunity to voice their approval or disapproval.
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that when given their say, shareholders at a resounding 98.5% of American companies have said “yes.” So it seems that, thus far, shareholders are hesitant to challenge Boards in their compensation decision-making.
This is not surprising, given the complexity of the decision that Boards face in setting executive pay. Setting executive pay is a task typically delegated to a Board’s “Compensation Committee.” Now consider the task faced by a Compensation Committee in establishing the total pay-and-incentive package offered to their CEO.
The question facing a Compensation Committee is this: what combination of cash, bonuses, equity, and perks should we put on the table in order to inspire our CEO to perform optimally? In practice, this is a pretty complex question, one not admitting of cookie-cutter solutions. A Comp Committee needs to consider, just for starters:
- pressures from shareholder (and other stakeholders),
- pressures from proxy advisory firms and various think-tanks,
- human psychology, including their particular CEO’s character and motivational levers,
- the managerial experience and expertise of Committee members,
- corporate objectives (profit, market share, sales, social responsibility, etc.),
- their company’s ‘risk appetite’ (roughly speaking, are they trying to incentivize their CEO to be bold, or conservative?),
- expert opinion about optimal compensation structures (which is deeply divided, to say the least).
The problem here is as much one of epistemology as it is one of ethics. Compensation Committees need to take an enormous amount of information and opinion and distill it into a decision that will work and that will be defensible in the face of enormous scrutiny.
Of course, there is no shortage of compensation consultants, ready and willing to help Compensation Committees with this task. But recent (not-yet-published) research at the Clarkson Centre suggests that many corporate directors are skeptical about the value of compensation consultants.
Given this complexity, it’s not surprising that shareholders — even sophisticated institutional shareholders — are so far pretty hesitant to do much second-guessing. Whether or not that’s a good thing is a separate issue.
Executives and their Income
Filed under: CEOs, compensation, contract, employees, finance, governance, pay |
Comments (11) I’ve blogged a number of times about what is commonly and loosely called “executive compensation.” The term is woefully imprecise. In point of fact, most “compensation” is not, in fact, compensation. The carrot dangled in front of a horse is not compensation; it is motivation. Compensation is what you give someone after the fact as reward for a job well done, or at least for a job that met contractual requirements. If I hire the neighbour’s kid to mow the lawn, and he does so, then I should compensate him. Most of the money garnered by senior executives at publicly-traded companies these days is not, in fact compensation. It’s money they get from selling shares in the company, shares granted to them as part of an effort to align their interests with the interests of shareholders.
The looseness of use of that word in the realm of finance is not at all unique. Witness the “bonuses” paid to AIG employees two years ago, which were not in fact performance bonuses at all but rather retention payments designed to keep key employees on what seemed at the time to be a sinking ship.
See more recently this piece by Peter Whoriskey for the Washington Post: With executive pay, rich pull away from rest of America. Here’s just a taste:
The top 0.1 percent of earners make about $1.7 million or more, including capital gains. Of those, 41 percent were executives, managers and supervisors at non-financial companies, according to the analysis, with nearly half of them deriving most of their income from their ownership in privately-held firms….
Notice that (contrary to the article’s title) the key factor in the growth of executive income here is not in fact “pay.” The key factor is investment income. And it’s not even “pay” in the loose sense of ‘money given by an employer,’ since there’s no indication here what portion of that investment income comes from shares in a CEO’s own company, say, versus a diversified portfolio. But it’s hard to hold Whoriskey to blame for the linguistic imprecision here; confusing pay and compensation and income is altogether standard.
The other point to be made here is about justice. According to Whoriskey, “…executive compensation at the nation’s largest firms has roughly quadrupled in real terms since the 1970s, even as pay for 90 percent of America has stalled…” Setting aside imprecision of language, that suggests a significant disparity — not disparity of outcomes (which are a given, here) but disparity of rate of improvement.
Now according to Leslie McCall, a sociologist quoted in Whoriskey’s story, people become concerned about such inequality “…when it seems that extreme incomes for some are restricting opportunities for everyone else.” And that may be true about people’s reactions. But of course, it’s very hard for people to tell when it is actually the case that extreme incomes for some are restricting opportunities for others. As economists often point out, income is not a fixed pile, waiting to be handed out. The way you distribute income actually changes the size of the ‘pie’ due to the way money incentivizes. Incentivizing executives with stock and stock options may on the whole be a failed experiment, but that doesn’t change the fact that it is impossible to know whether the average worker would be better or worse off had those incentives never been offered.
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Splitting CEO & Chair
Filed under: accountability, boards, CEOs, governance, shareholders |
Leave a Comment Research in Motion (a.k.a. “RIM”, maker of the Blackberry) has been under pressure to split the role of CEO and Chair. RIM has been facing serious scrutiny of late, and questions have arisen in particular about whether the company needs new leadership. Splitting the role of CEO and Chair would be an awfully good start.
See this Globe & Mail story, by Janet McFarland: Shareholder calls for splitting CEO, chair roles at RIM.
A small investor in Research In Motion Ltd. …is anticipating big support for a shareholder resolution calling on the BlackBerry maker to split the jobs of CEO and chairman.
Mutual fund company Northwest & Ethical Investments LP has argued RIM co-CEOs Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis should not also be co-chairs of the company’s board, arguing a “high performance” board needs independent oversight of management.
The story quotes Bob Walker, vice-president of Ethical Funds at Northwest & Ethical, as saying that keeping the two roles “has become standard practice, not just best practice.” More to the point, perhaps, is that it has become widely-recognized not just as standard, but as best. The board’s job is to oversee the CEO, and it’s hard to do that effectively if the CEO runs the board. (This was precisely the point of Friday’s blog entry on conflict of interest among mayors and chairs.)
You may well hear people point out that there’s no evidence that splitting the roles of CEO and Chair is beneficial, in the sense of increasing long-term shareholder value (or in terms of any other outcomes, for that matter). Fair enough. But to say that there’s no evidence is not to say that there’s no reason. Shareholders have a right to good governance, and that right doesn’t depend on concerete outcomes, any more than a client’s right to zealous legal representation does.
There’s another reason to favour splitting the chair & CEO. Even if such a split isn’t directly correlated with increasing shareholder value, it may well be correlated with other things that matter. My colleague Matt Fullbrook, of the Clarkson Centre for Board Effectiveness, puts it this way:
Since the early 2000s, splitting the Chair/CEO roles has become the norm in Canada, and with good reason: more than any other individual governance best practice, Chair/CEO split with an independent chair is highly correlated with adoption of other good governance practices and disclosure. That there is still push-back on splitting the roles is baffling.
Conflict of Interest for Mayors (and Other Committee Chairs)
Filed under: accountability, boards, CEOs, conflict of interest, ethics, governance, government, politics |
Leave a Comment This is a blog entry ostensibly about municipal politics, but with real lessons for the world of business.
I was on CBC radio yesterday (along with corporate governance expert Prof. Richard Lelblanc) to talk about conflict of interest case involving Halifax’s city council (technical the Council for Halifax Regional Municipality).
To make a long story short: the Mayor was involved in some financial irregularities that may (I honestly don’t know) just be a matter of either poor judgment or poor understanding of proper procedures. Whatever. The interesting part came when some members of Council wanted to reprimand the Mayor for his role in those decisions. The Mayor insisted on chairing the discussion, and indeed even voted on the matter when it came up for a vote. (Here’s an article about the fiasco, by Michael Lightstone for the Chronicle Herald: Halifax council won’t suspend mayor.)
Needless to say, in participating in the vote over his own fate, the Mayor was in a rather significant conflict of interest. He had an official duty to exercise, one that required the exercise of judgment. And he clearly also had a very significant personal interest in the matter, one that any reasonable outsider would be justified in suspecting of influencing the Mayor’s judgment.
Now it always bears repeating: conflict of interest is not an accusation. It is a situation one finds oneself in. There’s nothing unethical about being in a conflict of interest. (If a lawyer finds out that one of her clients wants to sue another of her clients, she is in a conflict of interest, through absolutely no fault of her own.) What matters is how you deal with the conflict.
The best thing for the Mayor to do would have been to:
- recognize the conflict,
- put it on the table, and
- recuse himself (i.e., hand over the gavel, decline to vote, and preferably leave the room so that the rest of Council could have a full and frank discussion).
What’s really at stake in conflict of interest has very little to do with the integrity of individuals. Rather, it has to do with the integrity of a decision-making process, and of an institution. So the worry is not that the Mayor would necessarily have been biased in how he chaired Council that evening. Maybe he bent over backwards to be fair in his chairing duties. Who knows? And that’s the point. We don’t know, but for important institutions we need a high level of certainty that key decision-makers are exercising their judgment in the interests of those they serve, rather than themselves.
And there, of course, is the lesson for the world of business, and in particular for corporate governance. A Mayor, effectively, is the CEO of a City. In addition, he or she also is “chair of the board of directors,” where the board here is City Council. In the world of municipal politics, it is relatively rare for Council (normally chaired by the Mayor) to sit in judgment of the Mayor as chief executive. But in the corporate world, such judgment is a big part of the job of a board of directors. And that is precisely why it is widely considered “best practice” for the CEO not to also serve as Chair. One of the Board’s key roles is to advise and oversee the CEO. Doing so requires that the Board be able to deliberate in a way that is reasonably independent from the CEO’s own influence. Any organization that has the CEO act as chair of the very body that must regularly deliberate over his or her own performance is not just “finding” itself faced by a conflict of interest, but is actively constructing one.
Roger Martin on Executive Compensation
Filed under: CEOs, compensation, corporations, governance, leadership, pay, shareholders |
Leave a Comment Yesterday I attended the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, along with a handful of colleagues from the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics.
The meeting’s keynote speech was given by Roger Martin, Dean of the Rotman School of Management. (Disclosure: I am a Visiting Scholar at Rotman.)
Martin’s speech was basically a summary of the key ideas from his new book, Fixing the Game: Bubbles, Crashes, and What Capitalism Can Learn from the NFL. (I mentioned Martin’s book a few weeks ago, in a blog posting called Business, Football, and Incentives.)
Here is a rough summary of what he had to say, paraphrased and condensed:
Prior to the mid-70′s, stock-based compensation for CEOs was rare. But starting especially in the 80′s, it became very common indeed. Martin traces the sea change to a famous paper by Michael Jensen and William Mecklin, called “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (PDF here). The basic idea at the time was that paying senior executives, and especially CEO’s, in company stock or stock options would align their interests with those of shareholders. Shareholders naturally want the value of stock to rise, and paying CEOs mostly in stock gave them a very concrete reason to want stock to rise, too.
It was a fine theory, says Martin, but it didn’t work out well. If you compare the era of stock-based compensation to an equivalent period before, you see that returns went down about 15% and stock volatility went up about 15%. Those definitely aren’t the kinds of results that shareholders were looking for.
And yet somehow people still cleave to the idea that stock-based compensation aligns interests. Why?
It’s clear enough why CEOs themselves are fans of the system. The reason, according to Martin, is rooted in the fact that stock prices only reflect the market’s collective expectations about a company’s future performance. That means in order to boost stock prices (and hence their own compensation) CEOs merely need to boost expectations. So, says Martin, that’s what CEOs have learned to do: manage stock analysts’ expectation, rather than managing actual performance. If analyst expectations are low when stock options are granted, and high when they get cashed out, a CEO stands to make a lot of money, independent of what that variation means in terms of actual performance.
But of course, says Martin, CEOs have realized that you can’t play that game for very long. So, they learned to look for opportunities to play a hit-and-run version of the game: get in, play hard, and cash out. That, he says, is the real reason why the average tenure of CEO is so short these days.
Is this malfeasance on the part of CEOs? Not really, says Martin. It’s just CEOs doing what they are payed — incentivized — to do.
Now, says Martin, compare this situation to the way quarterbacks are payed in professional football. Professional quarterbacks, he says, are paid for real, on-the-field performance. Additionally — and this is crucial — they are forbidden from profiting from outsiders’ expectations of how they will perform, i.e., from gambling on the outcome of the games they are playing in. Why? Because professional football leagues realize that letting quarterbacks gamble would give them all kinds of perverse incentives. The corporate world, it seems, has something important to learn from the world of pro football when it comes to incentivizing key personnel.
In the corporate world, says Martin, the only ones with something to gain from having stock-based executive compensation are CEOs and hedge funds. Both, he says, benefit from volatility of stock prices.
Martin’s prescription: performance-based compensation is fine. But don’t reward CEOs based on stock prices. Reward them based on real performance, in terms of something like earnings or sales or market share — different systems will make sense for different companies with different strategic objectives. But the point is to reward them for something more real than merely meeting the expectations of analysts.
It’s a provocative thesis, and a bold prescription. To say that stock-based compensation is “standard” is an enormous understatement. And Martin acknowledges that change, if it comes at all, will not come quickly. But given how widely-agreed-upon it is that current modes of compensation are not working, bold prescriptions may just be what is in order.
Organizational Diversity in a Capitalist Society
Today is the 2nd day of a 2-day workshop I’m attending on Regulatory Design, hosted by Duke University’s Kenan Institute for Ethics. I posted yesterday about the difficulty of developing and implementing effective regulations.
Day 2 of the workshop begain with a discussion of a stimulating paper by sociologist Marc Schneiberg, called “Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise”. Marc’s paper is about alternatives to the shareholder-driven corporation that currently dominates industrialized economies. He basically argues that, in the wake of economic crisis, we should at least have a renewed discussion of alternative models of economic organization. To be clear, Marc isn’t suggesting alternatives to capitalism, but rather promoting the idea of experimenting (further) with different ways of organizing business within a capitalist framework. In most jurisdictions, business law makes available plenty of non-corporate options for organizing business. But shareholder-driven firms dominate. So there are interesting empirical and normative questions about the balance between various forms.
Here are some interesting questions to ponder, with regard to this issue in general:
- Why do cooperatives of various kinds, and other non-shareholder-driven businesses, seem to thrive in some industries but not in others?
- If in fact shareholder-driven corporations are particularly conducive to instability and crisis, how common do alternative forms need to be in order to have an appreciable effect on the stability of the economy as a whole?
- From a public-policy point of view, what can (or should) governments do to encourage alternative business forms? (Note that in some places, alternative forms already receive, for example, favourable tax treatment.)
- Which particular problems (of governance or of ethics) are solved by non-corporate ways of organizing business?
- What are the costs (socially and individually) of various forms of organization?
- The profit motive (taken as driving shareholder-controlled corporations) is often singled out for criticism. But all organizations are, by definition, driven by some combination of motives. To what extent, and under what circumstances, are those motives more, or less, likely to encourage anti-social behaviour?
Essential reading for those interested in the empirical side of this topic is a book I’ve recommended here before, and which Marc cites in his paper, namely The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry Hansmann. It’s a dense scholarly book, written by a prominent scholar of corporate law. But for anyone with a serious interest in these topics, it’s well worth the effort. Hansmann’s basic argument (derived from an examination of various case-studies as well as international patterns) is that ownership patterns are best explained by things like a) homogeneity of interests among a group of stakeholders (whether they be shareholders or customers or employees or whatever) and b) the extent to which that group of stakeholders find it reasonably easy to monitor the behaviour of the organization’s managers. In other words, for any organization, some stakeholders want (and are willing to bargain for) control, whereas other stakeholders merely want (and are only willing to “pay” for) a thinner kind of interaction with the organization. The implication is that, if Hansmann is right, any thought that there could be a “better” or even “best” mix of organizational structures, from a social point of view, is going to run up against the fact that the actual mixture is being driven by the desires and capacities of millions of individual market participants, and changing the mix will require changing some of those desires, some of those capacities, or both.
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Ethics of Golden Handshakes
Filed under: boards, decision-making, employees, governance, leadership, pay, stakeholders |
Comments (2) When an executive leaves in disgrace, what does the organization owe him or her? How should a Board handle such situations? In some cases, contractual obligations may seem to settle the matter, but contracts can be contested. Should they be? Does the IMF’s Dominique Strauss-Kahn deserve a quarter million dollars?
For further food for thought, see this story, by Tom Hals and Dena Aubin, for Reuters: Strauss-Kahn severance revisits CEO pay dilemma
The IMF now faces a challenge that keeps members of corporate compensation committees up at night: explaining why they may have to pay a handsome severance package to an indicted executive.
…
Former International Monetary Fund managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, facing charges of attempted rape in New York, resigned his post from the global lender on Wednesday.Strauss-Kahn’s contract entitles him to a one-time severance payment of $250,000, the IMF said on Friday….
Whether a Board of Directors should attempt to fight in order not to pay severance to an executive who has brought disgrace upon the organization is clearly going to depend on the circumstances. But it serves as a good example of the conflict between two different styles of moral reasoning. On one hand, a Board thinking primarily in terms of consequences might well reason this way: “Look, we need to get past this unfortunate incident. Let’s pay this guy the money his contract says he is owed, and be done with it. It’s better for the firm, overall, if we pay and get this finished.” On the other hand, a Board might think primarily in terms of justice: “This guy has brought shame (or at least notoriety) upon the organization. He doesn’t deserve a dime. We should fight for what’s fair.”
The tension between these two styles of moral reasoning is an ancient one, and it’s perfectly reasonable to find something attractive in both styles of reasoning. But the fact that both kinds of reasons might occur to a single group of people — a Board of Directors — in a single situation implies an interesting question. Even if we were to agree (even for sake of argument) that a Board of Directors’ main obligation is to serve the interests of the organization and its shareholders, that still leaves open this important question: should a Board of Directors seek the best outcomes for the organization and its shareholders, or should it seek justice for it and for them?
